







can	be	pursued	not	 by	 following	 the	 free	market	 rules,	 but	 by	 reshaping	 them	by	means	of	
public	intervention.	This	message	was	widely	accepted	for	thirty	years	as	from	the	end	of	the	




world	when	compared	 to	 those	of	 twenty	–	 let	alone	eighty	–	years	ago,	although	 there	are	
notable	 similarities	 between	 the	Great	Depression	 of	 the	 1930s	 –	 Keynes’s	world	 –	 and	 our	
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the	 academic	 scene,	 still	 dominated	 by	 the	 macroeconomics	 of	 anti-	 or	 pre-Keynesian	
inspiration	that	took	hold	between	the	1970s	and	1980s.	
To	 reclaim	 the	 topical	 importance	 of	 The	 General	 Theory	 of	 Employment,	 Interest	 and	




by	 following	 the	 free	market	 rules,	 but	 by	 reshaping	 them	by	means	 of	 public	 intervention.	
This	message	was	widely	accepted	for	thirty	years	as	from	the	end	of	the	Second	World	War	by	
all	the	advanced	countries	which	actively	engaged	in	full	employment	and	welfare	policies,	and	




–	 let	 alone	 eighty	 –	 years	 ago,	 although	 there	 are	 notable	 similarities	 between	 the	 Great	




realm	 of	 method.	 In	 a	 famous	 letter	 to	 George	 B.	 Shaw,	 written	 a	 few	 weeks	 before	 the	
publication	of	 the	General	 Theory	 in	 February	 2016,	 Keynes	 announced	 it	 as	 a	 book	 “which	
will	 largely	 revolutionise	 […]	 the	way	 the	world	 thinks	 about	 economic	problems”	 (CWK	
XIII:	492).	And	in	the	same	letter	he	added:		
“When	my	 new	 theory	 has	 been	 duly	 assimilated	 and	mixed	with	 politics	 and	 feelings	 and	
passions,	 I	 can’t	predict	what	 the	 final	upshot	will	be	 in	 its	effect	on	action	and	affairs.	But	
there	will	be	a	great	change”	(CWK	XIII:	493).		
Rather	than	 invoking	the	“scientific”	aspect	of	his	theory,	Keynes	turned	to	“politics	and	
feelings	 and	passions”,	 to	 anticipate	 how	his	message	would	 be	 received.	 A	 couple	 of	 years	
later,	in	a	letter	to	Roy	Harrod,	recalling	the	story	of	Newton’s	discovery	of	the	law	of	gravity	
on	 observing	 an	 apple	 fall	 to	 the	 ground	 while	 sitting	 in	 the	 garden	 of	 Trinity	 College,	
Cambridge,	 Keynes	 listed	 the	 questions	 that	 an	 economist	 should	 be	 asking:	 for	 instance,	
whether	
“the	fall	of	the	apple	to	the	ground	depended	on	the	apple’s	motives,	on	whether	it	is	worth	
while	 falling	 to	 the	 ground,	 and	 whether	 the	 ground	 wanted	 the	 apple	 to	 fall,	 and	 on	
mistaken	 calculations	 on	 the	part	 of	 the	 apple	 as	 to	 how	 far	 it	was	 from	 the	 centre	 of	 the	
earth”	(CWK	XIV:	300).		
Economics	–	Keynes	wrote	–	“deals	with	 introspection	and	with	values	 [...]	 it	deals	with	
motives,	 expectations,	 psychological	 uncertainties’	 (CWK	 XIV:	 300),	 whose	 scope	 is	 neither	
“constant	 nor	 homogeneous”.	 There	 cannot	 be	 an	 analogy	 with	 physical	 sciences,	 because	
they	 aim	 at	 discovering	 regularities	 from	 which	 to	 derive	 general	 laws,	 while	 economics	 is	





different	 degrees	 of	 information.	 So	 the	 object	 of	 economic	 theory	 is	 that	 of	 developing	 a	
logical	way	of	thinking	about	factors,	which	are	“transitory	and	fluctuating.”	(CWK	XIV:	297).	
When	Keynes	states	in	the	General	Theory	that	the	level	of	employment	oscillates	around	






tern	of	 causes	 and	effects.	 The	 task	of	 economics,	 according	 to	Keynes,	 is	 rather	 to	 “select	
those	variables	which	can	be	deliberately	controlled	and	managed	by	central	authority	in	the	
kind	of	system	in	which	we	actually	live”	(ibid.).		
Keynes’s	 critique	 is	 directed	 against	 a	 conception	 of	 economics	 as	 scientific	 study	 of	
society	modelled	on	the	method	of	the	physical	sciences,	and	it	is	a	plea	to	start	investigating	
the	 problems	 involved	 in	 seeking	 to	 bring	 about	 desired	 end	 states.	 Only	 by	 exposing	 the	
fallacy	of	the	analogy	of	economic	laws	with	physical	laws	does	it	become	possible	to	promote	
values	and	attitudes	to	change	society.	Keynes	wrote:	
“it	 is	 many	 generations	 since	 men	 as	 individuals	 began	 to	 substitute	 moral	 and	 rational	
motive	as	their	spring	of	action	 in	place	of	blind	 instinct.	They	must	now	do	the	same	thing	
collectively”	(CWK	XVII:	453)	
Letting	 individuals	be	 guided	by	 self-interest	 alone	–as	 in	Adam	Smith’s	parable	of	 “the	
butcher,	the	brewer	and	the	baker”,	whose	pursuit	of	individual	profit	produces	a	social	good	–
is	 not	 a	 principle	 of	 general	 validity,	 because	 there	 are	 not	 always	 forces	 to	 harmonize	
individual	 interests	 and,	 moreover,	 aggregate	 economic	 behaviour	 does	 not	 have	 the	 same	
outcome	 as	 individual	 economic	 behaviour.	 If	 the	 goal	 is	 to	 change	 the	 environment	within	
which	 individuals	 operate,	we	ought	 to	 change	 the	way	we	 see	 the	economic	problem.	 This	
could	be	achieved,	according	 to	Keynes,	 through	 the	power	of	persuasion.	 In	a	 letter	 to	T.S.	
Eliot	of	5	April	1945,	he	wrote:		
	“[...]	 the	 main	 task	 is	 producing	 first	 the	 intellectual	 conviction	 and	 then	 intellectually	 to	
devise	the	means.	Insufficiency	of	cleverness,	not	of	goodness,	is	the	main	trouble	[...]	the	full	
employment	 policy	 by	 means	 of	 investment	 is	 only	 one	 particular	 application	 of	 an	
intellectual	theorem.	(CWK	XXVII:	384)”.	
And	earlier	on,	in	a	famous	speech	to	the	House	of	Lords	on	May	23,	1944,	he	wrote:	




elimination	 of	 unemployment	 possible,	 rejecting	 the	 doctrine	 that	whatever	 unemployment	
there	 is	 –	 as	 long	 as	 it	 is	 market	 generated	 –	 is	 a	 level	 which	 the	 same	market	 forces	 –	 if	
unimpeded	by	“rigidities”	(any	of	these:	prices,	wages,	interest	rate)	would	re-establish	in	the	
long	 run.	 This	 is	 the	 reason	why	 in	modern	macroeconomics	 this	 level	 has	 been	 labelled	 as	
“natural”.	
In	 the	aftermath	of	 the	Second	World	War	we	witnessed	a	 transformation	of	economic	
theory	into	a	set	of	models	which,	although	at	the	cost	of	extreme	simplification,	were	thought	





The	 stress	 on	 forecasting,	 measurement,	 empirical	 testing	 was	 meant	 to	 enhance	 the	
scientific	 aspect	 of	 economics,	 where	 “scientific”	 again	 implied	 resemblance	 to	 the	 physical	
science,	to	their	rigour	and	predictive	power.	
After	 Lionel	 Robbins	 (1932)	 had	 declared	 that	 ethics	 and	 political	 philosophy	
considerations	 should	 be	 banned	 from	 economic	 theory,	 Karl	 Popper	 in	 the	 1930s	 (Popper	
[1935]	1959)	vindicated	the	idea	that	economics	could	be	a	science	only	if	value-free	and	with	
predictive	power.	
In	 the	 following	 two	 decades	 Friedman's	 insistence	 on	 prediction	 as	 the	 only	 test	 for	
economic	 theories	and	Samuelson's	mathematization	of	economics	gave	a	new	boost	 to	 the	
faith	 in	 imitation	of	 the	physical	 sciences	as	 far	as	 the	chosen	method	of	 scientific	 inquiry	 is	
concerned.		
It	 is	now	apparent	that	this	conception	of	what	constitutes	a	good	economic	theory	has	
not	 proved	 reliable,	 having	 had	 –	 especially	 in	 the	 recent	 crises	 –	 many	 examples	 of	 the	
inadequacy	of	mainstream	theory	in	understanding	let	alone	predicting	forthcoming	events.	If	
facts	 are	 identified	with	 empirical	 estimates	 of	models	 that	 are	 believed	 to	 incorporate	 the	
progress	made	in	the	economic	literature,	 it	 is	clear	that	these	“facts”	are	heavily	dependent	
on	 the	 choice	 of	 the	models	 and	 the	methodology	 employed	 to	 find	 them.	 The	 relationship	
between	 facts	 and	 theory	 becomes	 opaque	 and	 we	 may	 reasonably	 challenge	 the	 motives	




formula	 telling	 us	 that	 every	 increase	 in	 autonomous	 expenditure	 (for	 instance	 private	 or	
public	investment	or	exports)	generates	–	through	induced	expenditure	(net	consumption,	i.e.	
allowing	for	taxation	and	imports)	–	an	increase	in	income	greater	than	the	initial	expenditure,	




(both	 functions	 of	 the	 level	 of	 income)	 necessary	 to	 finance	 the	 initial	 investment.	 The	
consensus	on	 this	proposition	 lasted	 for	almost	30	years	until	 it	was	 seriously	 challenged	by	
the	Monetarist	assault	of	the	late	sixties.	Building	on	his	(and	Franco	Modigliani’s)	earlier	work	
on	 the	 consumption	 function,	Milton	 Friedman,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 empirical	 estimate,	 showed	
that	 the	 independent	 variable	 in	 the	 consumption	 function	 was	 not	 current	 income,	 but	
income	that	can	be	assumed	to	be	perceived	as	permanent	over	an	individual	life-time.			
When	 consumption	 is	 made	 a	 function	 of	 permanent	 rather	 than	 current	 income,	 the	
value	 of	 the	multiplier	 becomes	much	 smaller,	 with	 the	 result	 that	 the	 whole	 idea	 that	 an	
increase	in	autonomous	expenditure	is	expansionary	was	lost,	sowing	the	seeds	for	mistrust	of	
fiscal	 policy	 as	 a	 means	 to	 reach	 full	 employment.	 This,	 which	 came	 to	 be	 named	 The	
Monetarist	 Counterrevolution,	 was	 taken	 further	 by	 Robert	 Lucas	 and	 the	 New	 Classical	
economists	 well	 into	 the	 1990s,	 meeting	 with	 feeble	 defence	 by	 the	 New	 Keynesians,	 who	
relegated	 the	 efficacy	 of	 the	 multiplier	 to	 the	 very	 short	 period,	 when	 prices	 and	 wage	
rigidities	prevented	the	system	from	getting	into	full	employment	equilibrium.	
Until	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 2007-8	 crisis	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 economic	 profession	 in	
prestigious	universities	and	institutions	such	as	the	World	Bank	and	the	IMF,	and	in	influential	








made	 it	 appear	 practically	 impossible	 for	 policymakers	 to	 time	 fiscal	 policy	 actions	 to	 jump-
start	the	economy.		
In	the	1950s	and	1960s,	when	Keynesianism	was	at	its	height,	the	multiplier	was	generally	
assumed	 to	 be	 about	 2	 (two).	 Then,	 in	 the	 1990s	 and	 2000s,	 these	 estimates	 gradually	
dropped,	leaving	the	consensus	range	about	0.5-0.7.	However,	the	value	of	the	multiplier	was	
again	 closer	 to	 1	 after	 the	 crisis.	 In	 fact,	 in	 2009	 the	 estimates	 by	 both	 the	 IMF	 and	 the	




This	 is	 just	 one	 example	 of	 how	 empirical	 evidence	 to	 a	 great	 extent	 depends	 on	 the	
nature	of	the	models	that	are	constructed	to	find	it,	and	also	on	the	behavioural	assumptions	
embedded	 in	 these	 models.	 In	 orthodox	 economics,	 consumers	 are	 said	 to	 pursue	 their	
individual	maximizing	utility	over	an	infinite	time	horizon	and	with	full	knowledge	of	possible	
outcomes	 and	 perfect	 foresight.	 This	 is	 precisely	 the	 opposite	 of	 consumer	 behaviour	 as	
viewed	 in	 Keynes’s	 macroeconomics,	 where	 perfect	 foresight	 and	 full	 rationality	 are	 not	
deemed	acceptable	assumptions,	because	probability	calculus	is	not	applicable:	when	there	is	
uncertainty,	as	 is	 the	case	 in	human	affairs	 in	general	and	 in	economic	matters	 in	particular,	
such	calculation	is	not	feasible.	
The	 assumption	 of	 perfect	 foresight	 was	 discredited	 after	 the	 events	 of	 2007-8.	 This	
meant	 bringing	 some	 modifications	 into	 the	 standard	 macro-models	 to	 incorporate	 limited	
rationality	 and	 knowledge,	 imperfections	 and	 rigidities	 in	 the	 goods,	 labour	 and	 financial	
markets.	 However,	 these	 modifications	 were	 made	 within	 a	 theoretical	 apparatus	 which	
remains	unchanged	 in	 its	main	 features	 and,	 in	 any	 case,	 still	 quite	 the	opposite	of	 the	way	
Keynes	understood	and	described	economic	behaviour,	which	was	never	imputed	to	abstract	
economic	agents,	but	always	to	individuals	who	have	specific	functions	and	characteristics.	
	Consumers,	 entrepreneurs	 or	 speculators	 always	 make	 their	 decisions	 in	 the	 face	 of	
uncertainty;	therefore,	according	to	Keynes,	their	behaviour	cannot	be	described	as	guided	by	







employed	 in	 orthodox	 economic	 theory.	 Keynes	 was	 not	 only	 a	 great	 economist,	 but	 an	
investor	on	a	 large	 scale,	 for	himself,	 his	 college	and	 insurance	 companies;	 at	King’s	College	
Archives,	 several	 unpublished	 papers	 document	 his	 investment	 strategy	 and	 philosophy,	
showing	how	painstakingly	he	collected	and	carefully	reviewed	all	the	evidence	before	making	
his	choices	(Cristiano	and	Marcuzzo	2018).	
Keynes’s	 rationality	 –	 which	 is	 not	 to	 be	 confused	 with	 optimizing	 choice	 –	 should	 be	
interpreted	 as	 “reasonableness”,	 a	 concept	 describing	 the	 attitude	 to	 adopt	 in	 situations	
where	following	the	rationality	 implied	by	economic	theory	might	 lead	to	very	unsatisfactory	







So	 far	 I	 have	 been	 arguing	 on	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	General	 Theory	 as	 a	 revolution	 in	
economic	 thinking;	now	 I	would	 like	 to	move	on	 to	a	more	 specific	 issue,	namely	when	and	




the	 best.	 This	 is	 not	 the	 crux	 of	 the	 matter	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Keynes’s	 subversion	 of	 the	
mainstream	 approach,	 but	 rather	 the	 role	 of	 effective	 demand	 in	 generating,	 income,	
increasing	production	and	guaranteeing	employment.	 It	 is	 the	 low	 level	of	effective	demand,	
not	the	rigidity	of	money	wages,	which	accounts	for	underemployment	equilibrium.	
Contrary	to	the	opinion	of	the	mainstream	economists,	Keynes	does	not	assign	to	prices	
(wages	 and	 interest	 rate	 included)	 the	 task	 of	 adjusting	 supply	 and	 demand	 to	 bring	 the	
system	 to	 full	 employment	equilibrium.	Only	by	 supporting	 a	high	 level	 of	 demand,	 through	
policies	designed	to	do	so,	can	this	goal	be	attained.	
However,	Keynes	was	not	in	favour	of	indiscriminate	deficit-financed	public	investments:	
in	 the	General	 Theory	we	 do	 find	 an	 apology	 for	 government	 intervention,	 but	 this	 is	 to	 be	




the	 instruments	 and	 the	 basic	 rate	 of	 reward	 to	 those	 who	 own	 them,	 it	 will	 have	
accomplished	all	that	is	necessary”	(CWK	VII:	378).	













classes”	 (Keynes	 CWK	XXVII:	 252),	 but	 he	was	 concerned	 about	 the	 budgetary	 aspects	 of	 it.	
However,	 while	 both	 Keynes	 and	 Beveridge	 were	 preoccupied	 with	 the	 moral	 and	 social	
problems	 deriving	 from	 unemployment,	 they	 looked	 for	 solutions	 along	 different	 paths.	 For	
Beveridge,	 it	 was	 the	 human	 fight	 against	 scarcity,	 the	 plague	 of	 cycles	 in	 production	 and	
business	 confidence	 –	 as	 unpredictable	 as	 weather	 and	 natural	 calamities,	 as	 he	 saw	 them	
(Harris	[1977]	1997).	Social	 insurance	was	meant	to	disjoint	 individual	coverage	from	general	





Keynes	 did	 not	 believe	 in	 the	 idea	 embraced	 by	Malthus	 and	Mandeville	 that	 opulent	
consumption	by	the	rich	provided	the	source	of	 income	and	employment	and,	therefore,	the	
key	to	economic	growth.	 In	the	General	Theory	consumption	 is	seen	as	the	necessary	means	
for	 the	 well-being	 of	 society;	 the	 propellant,	 so	 to	 speak,	 in	 the	 machinery	 to	 boost	
employment	and	income.	However,	Keynes	sees	two	major	problems	related	to	consumption.	
The	 first	 is	 satiation,	 which	 he	 believed	 derived	 from	 a	 “fundamental	 psychological	 law”,	
according	 to	 which	 “men	 are	 disposed,	 as	 a	 rule	 and	 on	 the	 average,	 to	 increase	 their	













“the	 task	 of	 adjusting	 to	 one	 another	 the	 propensity	 to	 consume	 and	 the	 inducement	 to	
invest”	(CWK	VII:	380)	or	“making	public	investment	a	counterweight	to	fluctuations	of	private	
investment”	(CWK	XXVII:	381).			
Keynes’s	 love	of	paradoxes	 lies	behind	 the	 famous	example	 that,	as	 Joan	Robinson	 tells	
us,	was	meant	“to	penetrate	the	thick	walls	of	obscurantism	of	the	old	laissez-faire	orthodoxy”	
(Robinson	1964:	91).	The	suggestion	was	for	the	Treasury	to	bury	bottles	filled	with	banknotes	
and	 let	private	 individuals	 lease	the	ground,	dig	out	the	bottles	and	pocket	the	money	(CWK	
VII:	 129).	 This	 is	 clearly	 a	paradox,	 against	 the	 view	 that	 every	operation	 should	make	a	 full	
profit	or	not	be	done	at	all.	Keynes’s	makes	his	point	–	it	does	not	matter	how	public	money	is	




practical	 difficulties	 in	 the	way	 of	 this,	 the	 above	would	 be	 better	 than	 nothing’	 (CWK	VII:	
129).		
The	 political	 difficulties	 mentioned	 by	 Keynes	 arise	 mainly	 from	 “the	 education	 of	 our	
statesman	 on	 the	 principles	 of	 the	 classical	 economics”.	 Moreover,	 expenditure	 on	 useful	
goods	and	 services	may	not	always	be	equally	practical:	 “Two	pyramids,	 two	masses	 for	 the	
dead,	 are	 twice	as	 good	as	one;	but	not	 two	 railways	 from	London	 to	York”	 (CWK	VII:	 129).	
Moreover	 “unless	 the	 rate	 of	 interest	 is	 falling	 pari	 passu”	 with	 the	 marginal	 efficiency	 of	
investment	 there	 is	 a	 limit	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 increasing	 the	 stock	 of	 wealth	 by	means	 of	













at	 home,	 it	 is	 utterly	 imbecile	 to	 say	 that	we	 cannot	 afford	 these	 things.	 For	 it	 is	with	 the	




The	 two	pillars	of	 the	Welfare	State	–	distrust	of	market	 forces	and,	with	 it,	 reliance	on	





Keynes’s	 approach	 to	 the	 way	 to	 fight	 unemployment	 should	 not	 identified	 with	 the	
welfare	 state,	 nor	with	 indiscriminate	 public	 spending,	with	 no	 concern	 for	 the	 government	
budget,	nor	with	attributing	the	causes	of	unemployment	to	the	rigidity	of	wages	and	prices,	
nor	 indeed	 with	 all	 the	 other	 distortions	 of	 the	 General	 Theory	 we	 find	 in	 the	 literature,	
showing	how	little	it	was	read	or	understood.	
Keynes’s	 message	 needs	 to	 be	 adapted	 to	 the	 present	 domestic	 and	 international	
circumstances,	but	it	is	still	topical	in	its	appeal	to	those	common	good	values	which	markets	
are	 sometimes	 unable	 to	 deliver.	 Keynes	was	 confident	 that	 addressing	market	 failures	was	
possible	 by	 placing	 in	 charge	 of	 institutions	 created	 for	 the	 purpose	 people	 –	 often	 chosen	
among	his	group	of	friends	–	who	were	of	high	moral	standards	and	fortitude.	
While	 Keynes	 rejected	 consequentialism	 in	 ethics,	 he	 endorsed	 consequentialism	in	 his	
political	 philosophy,	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 rules	 have	 to	 be	 set	 for	 given	 goals.	 The	 relevant	
question	becomes	how	these	goals	are	chosen	and	how	rigid	or	 fixed	 these	 rules	 should	be.	




		“The	 reformer	 is	 not	 he	 who	 would	 impose	 his	 own	 values	 on	 society,	 but	 he	 who	
understands	better	than	others	the	potential	for	change	in	the	moral	conventions	of	society	
itself,	and	acts	in	order	to	affect	such	change”.	(Carabelli	and	De	Vecchi	1999:	291).		
Two	 questions	 then	 arise:	 a)	 where	 does	 the	 “better	 understanding”	 of	 the	 reformer	
come	from;	b)	which	are	the	appropriate	actions	to	change	the	moral	conventions	of	society.	
The	answers	to	these	questions	are	scattered	among	Keynes’s	early	writings	on	ethics	and	
politics	 and	 his	mature	 work	 in	 economics,	 but	 they	 can	 also	 be	 gathered	 by	 reviewing	 his	












“Keynes’s	 elitism	 [is]	 of	 an	 essentially	 intellectual	 variety,	 as	 distinct	 from	 those	 elitisms	
stemming	 from	political,	 financial	or	military	power.	With	 individual	varying	 in	abilities,	and	
with	rationality	linked	to	logical	insight	and	knowledge,	the	presumption	is	strong	that	those	
with	 greatest	 mental	 power	 and	 education	 will	 have	 the	 greatest	 capacity	 in	 their	 given	
fields”	(O’	Donnell	1984:	66)	
And	he	concludes	that	“Elitism	is	always	a	possible	companion	of	intuitionist	philosophy”	
(ibid).	 It	was	 the	 belief	 in	 the	 rationality	 of	 ends	as	well	 as	means	 that	 led	 Keynes	 to	 value	








over	 individual	 effect.	 Another	 example	 is	 when	 the	 level	 of	 aggregate	 demand	 is	 kept	
drastically	 low	within	 a	 country	 to	 satisfy	 the	 reasons	 of	 the	 victor	 or	 creditor,	 leading	 to	 a	
deflationary	 potential	 for	 all	 the	 economies.	 Thus,	 lack	 of	 reasonableness	 leads	 to	
consequences	not	only	morally	reprehensible	but	also	economically	disastrous	for	anyone	who	
has	sought	guidance	solely	from	the	individual	point	of	view.	
In	 Keynes’s	 economics	 the	 impasse	 of	 failure	 to	 achieve	 the	 aggregate	 effect	 of	 full	
utilisation	of	resources	can	be	remedied	with	a	set	of	direct	and	indirect	instruments	designed	
to	overcome	individual	inertia	and	generate	the	level	of	demand	necessary	to	raise	the	level	of	
employment.	 Much	 has	 been	 written	 on	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 Keynes	 endorsed	 state	
intervention	 (Marcuzzo	 2010,	 Backhouse	 and	 Bateman	 2012).	 It	 is	 worth	 recalling	 the	main	
points	here.	
Keynes’s	 argument	 is	 summarized	 in	 the	need	 for	 fiscal	 stimulus	 to	boost	 the	 economy	
from	the	depths	of	recession;	the	burden	of	the	deficit	 is	not	seen	as	the	main	drawback	for	
government	 intervention,	 but	 as	 a	 condition	 necessary	 to	 address	 a	 failure	 in	 aggregate	
demand.	 This	 argument	 does	 not,	 however,	 imply	 unqualified	 government	 intervention.	
Government	expenditure	 is	to	be	finalised	to	provide	enough	 investment	to	counterweight	a	
decline	 in	private	 investment	and	a	 level	of	consumption	 insufficient	to	generate	the	 level	of	
aggregate	demand	necessary	to	maintain	full	employment.	
Although	Keynes’s	mistrust	of	the	smooth	working	of	market	forces	came	long	before	the	
General	 Theory,	 the	 case	 for	 intervention	 is	made	 there	 forcefully	 in	 the	 case	 of	 aggregate	
demand	failure.	However,	 the	policy	message	 in	the	General	Theory	 is	 to	sustain	the	 level	of	
investment	–	more	“stabilizing	business	confidence”	(Bateman	1996:	148)	than	debt-financed	
public	 works.	 His	 reliance	 on	 “socializing	 investment”	 rather	 than	 fiscal	 policy	 aiming	 at	
smoothing	out	consumption	levels	over	the	cycle	shows	his	concern	for	the	size	of	the	deficit	
and	 the	 importance	 attributed	 to	 market	 incentives	 to	 bring	 about	 the	 desired	 level	 of	
employment.	“If	the	State	is	able	to	determine	the	aggregate	amount	of	resources	devoted	to	
augmenting	 the	 instruments	 [of	production]	and	 the	basic	 rate	of	 reward	 to	 those	who	own	
them,”	he	wrote	in	the	General	Theory,	“it	will	have	accomplished	all	that	is	necessary”	(CWK	
VII:	378).		








operation	 and	 amity,	 and	 beyond	 that	 the	 profound	moral	 and	 social	 problems	 of	 how	 to	
organize	material	abundance	to	yield	up	the	fruits	of	a	good	life”	(CWK	XXVII:	261)			
Keynes	 rejected	 utilitarianism,	 both	 in	 ethics	 and	 politics,	 and	 he	 did	 not	 endorse	
consequentialism	 in	his	ethical	philosophy,	but	he	accepted	 it	 in	his	political	philosophy,	 the	
purpose	of	which,	he	believed,	was	to	provide	reasons	for	action.	
According	 to	 Keynes,	 the	 goal	 of	 an	 ethically	 rational	 society	 could	 be	 achieved	 by	
















look	 for	 solutions	 to	 mass	 unemployment	 and	 economic	 disruption.	 The	 second	 is	 the	 still	
pervasive	 free-market	 ideology	 that	 inspired	 the	policies	and	behaviour	 that	played	no	small	
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